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[L. A. No. 22258. In Bank. Aug. 5, 1952.]

D. L. GODBEY & SONS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY (a
Corporation), Appellant, v. BEN C. DEANE et al., Respondents.
[1] Contracts-Modi1ication-Consideration.-Where' oral modifi-

cation of written contract for cement work is made before
performance is started, the substitution of new rights and
duties based on a new method of computing the quantity of
concrete is adequate consideration for relinquishment of reciprocal rights of the parties under the old.
[2] Id.-Modi1ication-Written Contracts.-Civ. Code, § 1698, relating to modification of written contracts, invalidates oral
contracts of modification that are unexecuted and validates
executed agreements that might otherwise fail for lack of
consideraion.
[3] Id.-Modi1ication-Written Contracts.-Since in such cases as
agreements to accept less than is due under the terms of a
written contract, or to accept performance at a later date
than providcd in the writing, the modification agreement requires no additional act or forbearance on the part of the
obligor, it can only be executed to the extent that the obligee
accepts performance in accordance with its terms.
[4] Id.-Modification-Written Contracts.-Where there is consideration for an oral agreement modifying a written contract,

[lJ See Cal.Jur., Contracts, § 227; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 407.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Contracts, § 191; [2,4] Contracts,
§ 189; [3J Contracts, § 190.
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the rights and duties of both parties to the written contract
are affected and execution by one party is sufficient to allow
him to enforce the modification against the other, whether
or not the latter has performed on his part.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County.•Julius V. Patrosso, Judge. Reversed.
Glen Byhymer and Lewis M. Andrews for Appellant.
Edmond Gattone for Respondents.
Gardiner Johnson, Thos. E. Stanton, Jr., and John A.
Sproul, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment
for defendants entered after a demurrer to its fourth amended
complaint was sustained without leave to amend.
Plaintiff alleged that it entered into a written contract to
perform the cement work for a building that defendants
were erecting. Under the terms of the written contract the
cement work for the foundation walls and retaining walls
was to be paid for at the rate of $0.76 per cubic foot, and
the basis of the payment was to be determined by the actual
ineasurement of forms. Plaintiff further alleged, "That thereafter, and prior to the commencement of the performance
of said work, a conference was held between plaintiff and
the defendants, at which it was orally agreed and mutually
stated, each to the other, that the phrase, '(3) TERMS OF PAYMENT: Basis of payment to be determined by actual measurement of forms' was ambiguous and, furthermore, that it did
not provide for the method of computing cubic concrete work
not contained within the forms, and the defendants then
and there, in exchange for their mutual covenants and agreements in that respect, and for the purpose of eliminating
possible future dispute between the parties to said contract,
and in order to provide for that portion of the concrete that
under the plans was required to be poured outside of forms
(and which ultimately was actually poured outside of forms)
orally expanded and clarified said written agreement by entering into an understanding that, in order to properly arrive
at the amount of cubic concrete work in foundation and retaining walls and footings upon said jobsite, whether poured
within or outside of forms, the parties to said contract would
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calculate the amount of cubic yards of concrete actually poured,
whether within forms or outside of forms, and, with respect
to such classes of work only (to ,vit: cubic concrete work in
foundations and retaining walls and footings), at the contract price of 76 cents per cubic foot, or $20.52 per cubic
yard, less a deduction therefrom of the usual and customary
allowance for normal shrinkage and wastage [of 3% per
cent], and that, in order to implement said agreement and
understanding, the plaintiff would furnish to the defendants
each day during the performance of said contract, copies of
delivery tickets, a copy of each delivery ticket to accompany
the delivery of each consignment of concrete delivered on
the jobsite, such delivery tickets to show the actual cubic
yards of concrete poured on the jobsite each day and until
the full performance of the contract."
Plaintiff also alleged that it had performed the contract
as modified and supplied the required daily reports of deliveries and that under the terms of the contract as modified
there remained due and owing the sum of $12,182.99 out of
a total of $86,830.93.
Defendants contend that the alleged modification of the
written contract is invalid because of lack of consideration
and because it was not in writing, and that accordingly, the
complaint is fatally defective in failing to alleged that any sum
is due and unpaid under the terms of the written contract.
It is unnecessary to pass upon the conflicting contentions
of the parties as to whether the alleged resolution of an ambiguity in the terms of the written contract would constitute
sufficient consideration for the oral agreement in this case.
Under the terms of the modification the method of computing
the quantity of concrete was changed, and the amount actually
poured on the jobsite was substituted for an amount to be
determined by the measurement of the forms. If this modification had been made in writing, it is clear that it would
have been a valid contract supported by adequate consideration. [1] Since the modification was made before performance was started, the substitution of the new rights and
duties based upon the new method of measurement was adequate consideration for the relinquishment of the reciprocal
rights of the parties under the old. (Fleming v. Law, 163
Cal. 227, 2:33 [124 P. 1018] ; Gottlieb v. Tait's Inc., 97 Cal.
App. 235, 237-238 [275 P. 446] ; Sass v. Hank, 108 Cal.App.2d
207, 215 [238 P.2d 652].) Moreover, plaintiff promised to
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provide daily reports, and both parties were relieved of the
necessity of computing the volume of the forms from linear
measurements.
Section 1698 of the Civil Code provides: "A contract in
writing may be altered by a contract in writing, or by an
executed oral agreement, and not otherwise." Section 1661
provides: "An executed contract is one, the object of which
is fully performed. All others are executory." Defendants
contend that under these provisions the oral modification was
invalid because it was not executed. Plaintiff contends, on
the other hand, that in the case of building contracts an oral
modification is fully executed when the work has been completed in accordance with its terms whether or not the agreed
price has been paid.
[2] Section 1698 has a dual operation. On the one hand
it invalidates oral contracts of modification that are unexecuted, and on the other hand, it validates executed agreements
that might otherwise fail for lack of consideration. (Julian
v. Gold, 214 Cal. 74, 76 [3 P.2d 1009].) Typical of the
latter category are agreements to accept less than is due
under the terms of a written contract (Julian v. Gold, S1t.pra
[reduced rent] ; Sinnige v. Oswald, 170 Cal. 55, 57 [148 P.
203] [same]; Taylor v. Taylor, 39 Cal.App.2d 518, 522 [103
P.2d 575] [reduced monthly payments under a property
settlement agreement]), or to accept performance ata later
date than that provided in the writing. (Harloe v. Lambie,
132 Cal. 133, 136 [64 P. 88] ; Henehan v. Hart, 127 Cal. 656,
657-658 [60 P. 426].) [3] Since in such cases the modification agreement requires no additional act or forbearance on
the part of the obligor, it can only be executed to the extent
that the obligee accepts performance in accordance with its
terms. Accordingly, in the absence of a valid waiver of
1\ condition (Knarston v. Manhattan Life 1118. Co., 140 Cal.
57, 62-64 [73 P. 740] ; Panno v. RU8S0, 82 Cal.App.2d 408,
412 [186 P.2d 452] ; Bardeen v. Commander Oil Co., 40 Cal.
App.2d 341, 347 [104 P.2d 875]), or facts establishing an
('stoppel to rely upon section 1698 (Wilson v. Bailey, 8 Cal.
2d 416, 421·422 [65 P.2d 770] ; Panno v. Russo, supra). the
section may only be satisfied by execution on the part of the
obligee by accepting l('s than his due. (Stolttenberg v. Harl1eston, 1 Ca1.2d 264, 266 [34 P.2d 472] ; Henehan v. Hart,
127 Cal. 656, 657-658 [60 P. 426] ; Stafford v. Clinard, 87
Cal.App.2d 480, 481 [197 P.2d 84] ; Battaglia v. Winchester
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Dried Pruit 00., 32 Cal.App.2d 436, 437 [90 P.2d 111] ; Har"ey v. DeGarmo, 129 Cal.App. 487, 492-493 [18 P.2d 971];
~Jiddlecamp v. Z1/mwolt, 100 Ca1.App. 715, 722-725 [280 P.
1003].)
[4] The situation is different, however, where there is
{'onsideration for the oral modification agreement. In such
cases the rights and duties of both part ips to the ,vritten
contract are affected, and by performing the contract as
modified each party will be in a position to execute the oral
agreement on his side. It is necessary to determine, therefore, whether in such cases execution by onc party is sufficient
to allow him to enforce the modification against the other.
The language of the cases is in conflict. It has been stated
that an oral agreement to be executed within the meaning
of section 1698 must be fully performed on both sides. (Pearsall v. Heflry, 153 Cal. 314, 325 [95 P. 154, 159] ; Klein Norton' 00. v. Oohen, 107 Cal.App. 325, 330 [290 P. 613] j Walther
v. OccidentaZ Life Ins. 00 .• 40 Cal.App.2d 160, 166 [104 P.2d
5511; Keeler v. Murphy, 117 Cal.App. 386, 390 [3 P.2d 950] ;
Sffoltcnberg v. HanJestnn. 1 Ca1.2d 264. 266 f34 P.2d 4721;
Hert'ey v. DeGarmo, 129 Cal.App. 487, 492-493 [18 P.2d
9711. ) In tbe Pearsall and Klei.n Norton cases it was held,
however, that there had bpen a valld oral abrogation of the
writtpn contract followed by a substitution of an enforceable
oral contract. In the Kepler and Walther cases i.t was held
that plaintiff had not performed the alleged oral agreement,
anci in the Stoltenberg and Harvey pases there was no consiclpration for the modifieation. On the other hand, in cases
in which there was adequatfl consideration for the oral modifi('ation. and in which the party relying- therf>on had fully performed. the contract has befln enforcf>d as modified \vhether or
not the other party had performed on his part. (Wood v. ,
Nelsnn. 220 Cal. 139, 141 [29 P.2il 854] : Katz v. Bedford,
77 Cal. 3]9, 323 [19 P. 523. 1 TJ.R.A. 8261: Roberts v. Wachfpr. 104 Cal.App.2d 271. 280 f231 P.2d 5341; N1tttman v.
f!hais, 101 Cal.App.2d 476, 478 [22:) P.2d 6601; Lacy Mfg.
Cn, v. Gold Orou'lI Mining Cn., 52 Clll.App.2d 568, 578 P26
P.2d 6441 j Oatman v. Eddy, 4 Ca1.App. 58, 60 f87 P. 2101 ;
spe, also, Ander80n v. •To'hmstoll, ]20 Cal. 657, 659 f53 P. 264] ;
l~f()cHnn Oombiflcd H. &'7 Agr. Wks. v. Glens Palls Iml. (Jo.,
121 Cal. 167, 175 [53 P. !l651: ,!;ffate P. (Jo. v. HersheZ Oalif.
P. P. Co .. 8 Cal.App,2d 524. !)2!l [47 P.2d 8211.) Since plaintiff has allE'ged an adequate considE'ration for the oral modifica:

)

)

434

D. L. GODBEY & SONS CONST. CO.

V.

DEANE

[39 C.2d

tion and full performance on its part under the terms thereof,
it has stated a cause of action.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter,
curred.

J~,

con-

SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. The majority of this court,
by a process disguised as statutory construction, strike the
word "executed" from section 1698 of the Civil Code and
invite fraudulent minded persons to perpetrate, and be rewarded for, fraudulent schemes unhampered longer by rules
which for centuries the accumulated wisdom of mankind had
deemed desirable.
The majority opinion is one further step in the court-erosion
of salutary code provisions of this state which embody longstanding rules of Anglo-American .law designed to prevent
successful fraud and perjury. Provisions which have this
purpose include the present rule (Civ. Code, § 1698), the
statute of frauds (Civ. Code, §§ 1624, 1624a, 1724), and the
aspect of the parol evidence rule (Civ. Code, § 1625) which
would exclude extrinsic evidence of negotiatious which preceded or accompanied execution of an integrated writing to
vary the terms of that writing. The latter rule was refused
application by the majority of this court in Simmons v. California Institute of Technology (1949), 34 Ca1.2d 264, 274
[209 P.2d 581] (see dissenting opinion, pp. 290-292).
Now the majority turn their attention to section 1698
and, instead of accepting the clear import of the language
(and the frequently stated holding) that "an executed oral
agreement" means one which has been fully performed (see
cases cited (ante, p. 433 [246 P.2d 948) of majority opinion; Fuller v. Mann (1932), 119 Cal.App. 568, 573 [6 P.2d
999]; Taylor v. Taylor (1940), 39 Cal.App.2d 518, 522
[103 P.2d 5751). they announce that a written agreement
can be modified by an oral agreement which has been performed only by the party who seeks enforcement of the modifying agreement. The two decisions of this court which the
majority cite (amte. p. 433 [246 P.2d 948], as permitting such
enforcement do so withont discussion of the reason for the
rille. and without mention of Rection 1698 (Katz v. Bedford
(1888)' 77 Cal. 319, 323 [19 P. 523. 1 L.R.A. 826] ; Wood v.
Nelson (1934), 220 Cal. 139, 141 [29 P.2d 8541). The eases
cited by the majority which characterize an agreement per-
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formed by plaintiff alone as "executed" ignore plain statutory
language. Section 1661 of the Civil Code provides that" An
executed contract is one, the object of which is fully performed." The object of an oral modifying agreement is to
modify the prior agreement, and this object is not fully performed until the modifying agreement has been performed
on both sides.
.
Writers upon the subject of parol modification of written
contracts have recognized that in California by statute such
modification can be accomplished only by a parol agreement
fully performed on both sides (see 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 377,
p. 866; 4 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1943 Rev.), Contracts, § 226,
p. 162; 2 Rest., Contracts, §407, Cal. Annotations (1933».
That this has been the California rule has been recognized even
by writers who assume to characterize section 1698 as "bad"
(6 Corbin, Contracts (1951), § 1316, p. 233) or "unfortunate"
(6 Williston, Contracts (rev. ed.), § 1828, p. 5179).
As 1 have already indicated, in accord with the great weight
of authority, reflecting the accumulated wisdom of centuries
of striving for justice under law, I do not believe that the
statute, aptly designed to prevent fraud, is "bad" or "unfortunate." The reason for rules such as that of section 1698,
and of the statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule, was
well stated at least as long ago as 1604, in The Countess of
Rutland's Case, (Trin. 2 Jac. 1) 5 Co.Rep. 25b, 26a-26b, 77
Eng.Rep. 89, 90: "[I] t would be inconvenient, that matters
in writing made by advice and on consideration, and which
finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be
proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory. And
it would be dangerous to purchasers and farmers, and all
others in such cases, if such nude averments against matter
in writing should be admitted." The reason is applicable
here. A party to a written agreement should not be able,
by rendering either a different performance from, or as here
precisely the same as, that called for by the agreement and
averring that such performance was rendered pursuant to
an oral modification of the agreement, to require of the other
party a performance different from that which the latter
promised in writing.
The precise holding of the majority here can be graphically
illustrated by applying it to these more simple, but legally
exactly parallel, facts: Seller agrees in writing to sell and
deliver, and Buyer likewise agrees to accept and purchase,
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1,000 short tons of steel a month for 12 months for a price
of $110 a ton. Twelve thousand tons of steel are delivered.
By today's decision, at the end of the year the door is wide
open, and the court invites, fraudulent minded Mr. Seller
to sue and recover twice the agreed selling price through the
simple expedient of alleging that there was an oral modifying
agreement, l1lt1de subsequent to the signing and delivery of
the written contract but before delivery of the steel, that
solely for purposes of computing the price to be paid a ton
should be considered as consisting of 1,000 pounds; this court,
consistently with its majority decision today, must uphold
Seller in his argument tllat the oral agreement is executed
in that Seller has fully performed by delivering the steel
as agreed.
In compliance with long-established law the judgment should
be affirmed.
Hesprlllrlellts' petitioll for a rehearing was denied September
4, 1932. Schaurr, J., and Spence, J., were of the opinion
that the petition shonlrl be granted.

